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A changing balance of power between Washington and Beijing has dominated discourse on 
regional and global trends in both academic and policy circles. While ample body of 
literature deals with the question of deterrence vis-a-vis the US and China, less attention is 
given to medium powers in the Asia Pacific regarding their policy decisions to adapt to a 
dynamic balance of power. This paper looks at how two key regional players, Taiwan and 
Japan, have shifted their strategic perceptions from territorial defense to a more active 
deterrence regarding the PRC. It gives an overview of the state of the theory of deterrence 
in IR and Security Studies literature, followed by an assessment of changing Chinese 
military capabilities. It then shows the strategic perceptions and expressed intentions of 
Japanese and Taiwanese defense reforms that highlight deterrence as a core concept. The 
two regional actors’ deterrence strategies share core similarities and represent special 
cases of deterrence thinking that can contribute to theoretical analysis of deterrence 
strategy in the 21st century. KEYWORDS: Deterrence, China, Japan, Taiwan 
Az „Elsõ szigetlánc” hullámtörõi – rendszer szintû hasonlóságok 
Japán és Tajvan korlátozott elrettentés stratégiáiban 
A regionális és globális trendekrõl folytatott diskurzust mind tudományos, mind politikai 
körökben meghatározza a Washington és Peking közötti változó erõviszonyok kérdése. Míg 
a szakirodalom bõségesen foglalkozik az USA-val és Kínával szembeni elrettentés 
kérdésével, addig az ázsiai-csendes-óceáni térség közép-hatalmainak kevesebb figyelmet 
szentel, holott szakpolitikájuk természetszerûen alkalmazkodni kényszerül a dinamikusan 
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és Japán hogyan helyezte át stratégiai figyelmét a klasszikus területvédelemrõl a Kínát 
érintõ aktívabb elrettentésre. Áttekintést ad az elrettentés elméletének irányairól a 
vonatkozó szakirodalomban, majd áttekinti a kínai katonai képességek változását. Végül 
láthatjuk, a japán és tajvani stratégiákban hogyan alakul ki az elrettentés, mint megoldási 
lehetõség. A két regionális szereplõ elrettentési stratégiája alapvetõ hasonlóságokat mutat 
és az elrettentés speciális változatát képviselik. Japán és Tajvan elrettentési törekvéseinek 
vizsgálata hozzájárulhat a 21. század elrettentési stratégiáinak behatóbb megértéséhez. 
KULCSSZAVAK: Elrettentés, Kína, Japán, Tajvan 
Introduction 
The rapid increase of China’s economic potential and the long overdue modernization of its 
military, launched in the 1990s, has reconfigured global power politics in a way that most 
experts – for more than a decade – have been contemplating a great power rivalry between 
the US and the PRC.1 The most commonly used concept to illustrate what the rise of China 
might mean for the global order is the “Thucydides trap”,2arguing for the determined 
inevitability of clash between status quo and revisionist centers of power. Proponents of 
this argument point to the structural similarities between the Peloponnesian clash of 
interests and the current possible collision course on which the rise of Chinese power puts 
both Washington and Beijing.3 While one can argue against the inevitability of clashing 
interests, from a strategic theoretical standpoint, the most logical way to deal with a 
revisionist actor is deterrence. Accordingly, deterrence-based conceptualization dominates 
strategic thinking on US-China power dynamics. However, much less attention is given to 
the agency in deterrence to regional powers other than the US, whose strategic concerns 
are also mainly focused on the rise of Chinese military and other capabilities. This paper 
looks at two non-nuclear East Asian powers, Japan and Taiwan and gives a comprehensive 
overview on their respective deterrence strategies towards the PRC. Structural similarities 
in the patterns of deterrence strategy, point towards a trend developing among the 
examined international actors. Deterrence strategies in these two cases are aimed at 
denying favorable military operational, strategic, and political conditions for Chinese 
unilateral adventurism regarding the status quo of bilateral flashpoints. Such trends are the 
emphasis on conventional military capability enhancement, pro-active diplomatic 
initiatives, and diversification of relevant economic segments in order to lessen Beijing’s 
military, diplomatic and economic leverages. 
 
1 Mearsheimer, John J., The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001. pp. 401-402. 
2 Based on the analogy of how the status quo power Sparta had a clash of interests with the rising “revisionist” 
power, Athens. 
3 Allison, Graham, “The Thucydides Trap: are the US and China headed for war?“ The Atlantic, 24 (2015). 
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Deterrence and Theoretical Frameworks 
Deterrence has been the key strategic theory for conceptualizing power rivalry between 
China and the US. Deterring China from unilaterally annexing Taiwan has long dominated 
Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategy. On the other side of the Strait, the Chinese military’s 
A2/AD capabilities are mostly regarded as deterrents against a US intervention in China’s 
Pacific coastlines.4 However, the strategic theoretical framework of deterrence has faced 
some conceptual challenges after the end of the Cold War. 
Deterrence, as a strategy applied by relevant powers in international relations, is a 
factor that can contribute to the construction of analytic frameworks when theorizing about 
the structure of global politics. But the problem with theoretical approaches that 
incorporate deterrence, is that the strategy itself is inherently complex and involves abstract 
calculations. That is because it is not a strategy involving any singular operational concept 
(such as a preemptive strike, or certain disposition capabilities), but a comprehensive 
strategic complex aimed at the political will of an opponent or target audience. Because 
deterrence is such a composite idea, theoretical approaches in Security Studies literature 
cover wide ranges of topics and capabilities, from nuclear, to conventional, and non-
conventional, such as cyber warfare.5 
The most common within theoretical literature on the strategy of deterrence is nuclear 
strategy and nuclear weapons-based deterrence. In some cases, the word „deterrence” is 
synonymous for nuclear deterrence.6 
However, the bipolar tradition of Cold War approaches is still tangible in theoretical 
works on deterrence. Conceptualization of deterrence in the case of East Asia for example 
mainly focuses on US agency against Beijing – and as a secondary issue, the WMD program 
of North Korea – and merely regards the Alliance structure members (such as Japan or 
Taiwan) as parts of the structure, but not as agents within a system of deterrence. Some 
arguments explain this heavily US focused approach on East Asian deterrence with the 
assumption, that deterrence without nuclear weapons capability is sufficiently credible. 
Conventional deterrence requires multiple layered weapons-systems complexes more 
composite than a nuclear triad and complex systems of military capabilities are more likely 
to fail, thus less credible in terms of deterring an adversary.8 
Strategic theory conceptualizes deterrence in two ways: deterrence by denial, or by 
punishment. As some describe deterrence by denial dates back to centuries of military 
history and is aimed at either stopping or defeating an attack. It can also be done by a 
military buildup that guarantees the would-be aggressor such a number of casualties that 
 
4 Bonds, Timothy M., Joel B. Predd, Timothy R. Heath, Michael S. Chase, Michael Johnson, Michael J. Lostumbo, 
James Bonomo, Muharrem Mane, and Paul S. Steinberg, What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-
Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression? Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2017. pp. 97-98l . 
5 Jabbour, Kamaal T., and E. Paul Ratazzi, “Does the United States Need a New Model for Cyber Deterrence?“ in 
Lowther, Adam, ed., Deterrence. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012. pp. 33-45. 
6 Booth, Ken, Theory of world security. Vol. 105. Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. 109., 155., 267. 8
 Morgan, Patrick M., Deterrence now. Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. 276-278. 
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the political will behind aggression is dissuaded by the prior calculations of possible 
casualties. The advent of air power, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons have created a 
second approach to deterrence: deterrence by punishment. This element allows one to 
inflict unacceptable casualties on an attacker without having to engage its military 
capabilities.7 Most great- and superpower deterrence approaches – states that are de facto 
nuclear powers as well as have substantial militaries – rely heavily on strategic deterrence 
by punishment while also incorporating elements of deterrence by denial. However, neither 
Taiwan nor Japan are nuclear powers, nor can their individual military capabilities justify the 
threat of inflicting strategic level casualties on a much larger country such as China. As such, 
the only element of deterrence they are individually capable of implementing is denial, 
although the US nuclear umbrella supplements this with a strategic level of punishment. As 
the paper strives to demonstrate, Taipei and Tokyo are consciously and actively pursuing 
deterrence in their military strategies regarding China but since it is restricted to the denial 
aspect of deterrence, this can only be regarded as a form of limited deterrence. This does 
not mean, however, that limited deterrence cannot have the effect of influencing the prior 
calculations and political will of a theoretical aggressor. Even deterrence by denial can 
hamper possible political gains of military aggression by severely lowering operational 
confidence and increasing prospected casualties. As such, understanding limited deterrence 
pursued by Taiwan and Japan as well as the agency of individual actors in the US alliance 
structure in East Asia contributes to the strategic understanding of power balance in Asia 
Pacific. 
Rise of Chinese Military Capabilities, the Us Alliance System and 
Regional Perceptions on a Changing Balance of Power 
Rising Chinese Military Capabilities 
The People’s Republic of China has been able to gradually increase its military budget in 
significant proportions for more than two decades now, becoming the country with the 
second largest defense spending.8 Subsequently, the budgetary increases have brought with 
them a comprehensive modernization within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) services, 
starting with the acquisition of high-end weapons systems in the 1990s, to domestic 
developments of such equipment in the 
2010s, such as China’s homegrown 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft.11 
One of the major foci in China’s military modernization and capacity building was the 
operational concept of anti-access / area denial (A2/AD), which is a complex set of weapons 
systems aimed at targeting kinetic and non-kinetic attacks at an opponent’s naval 
capabilities, heavily relying on either shore based anti-ship weapons, or smaller naval and 
air assets armed with anti-ship missiles. By the early 2010s, the PLA had developed 
 
7 Mazarr, Michael J. Understanding Deterrece. RAND 2018. 
8 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance 2019. Routledge, 2019. pp. 21-22. 11 IISS. 
The Military Balance 2012. Routledge, 2011. p. 197. 
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substantial elements of A2/AD that, according to some analysis, had the potential to deter 
US intervention close to Chinese shores in a cost-effective way by possessing large 
quantities of anti-ship missiles capable of striking at US Navy strike forces.9 The assessment 
of „cost-effectiveness” refers to the fact that while becoming a peer competitor in naval 
power would require vast national resources, a substantial arsenal of land based anti-ship 
missiles is a much lighter investment, while still changes the balance of power in a favorable 
way for China. In most analyses on Chinese A2/AD capabilities, the concept is regarded as 
an asymmetric – in a sense that instead of rivaling US Naval power, shore-based and other 
anti-ship missile strike capabilities are developed – deterrence strategy against US naval 
presence around contingencies sensitive to Beijing’s interests.10 
Another, somewhat more recent endeavor of Chinese military modernization and force 
buildup are weapon systems and supporting equipment that enhance China’s power 
projection capabilities. The most symbolic of these was the launch of the PLA Navy’s first 
aircraft carrier, the Liaoning in 2012, followed by a second carrier in 2019.11 Aircraft carriers, 
however, are not the only assets for maritime power projection. China also fields four large 
amphibious assault ships (in naval terminology: Landing Platform Dock – LPDs) of the Yuzhao 
class, and in 2019 it launched its first „helicopter carrier”, the Type 075, classified as a 
Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD). Asides from central and visible principal surface vessels of 
power projection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) fields 10 nuclear and 55 diesel electric submarines, 
4 nuclear-powered and armed with ballistic missiles, a surface fleet of 1 cruiser, 28 
destroyers, with a large additional fleet of smaller ships, 52 frigates and 43 corvettes.12 
While the PLA ground forces are one of the largest armies in the world, they might factor 
less in other missions than mainland territorial defense, however, the PLAN marines, 
organized into four brigades and numbering around 25,000 personnel, also constitute 
crucial elements of Chinese power projection assets.16 
China is also a nuclear power, with an estimated arsenal of 70 or more warheads 
actively deployed on ballistic missiles. This is a much smaller force than that of Russian or 
American nuclear capabilities and China has a declared nuclear strategy of „no-first-use”, 
meaning it theoretically only employs nuclear forces for retaliatory strikes in order to deter 
other nuclear powers from using their strategic weapons against China. Also, China’s nuclear 
doctrine expresses Beijing’s commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
power adversaries. While IR and Security Studies literature ponders on the realities and 
possibilities of Chinese no-first-use policy, it is not within the scope of this paper, nor the 
intention of the author to question the credibility of official PLA nuclear doctrine. It is also 
important to emphasize, that Beijing is highly keen on representing its military capabilities 
as primarily defensive in nature. All official published strategic documents highlight a 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 IISS. The Military Balance 2012. Routledge, 2011. p. 197. 
11 IISS. The Military Balance 2019. Routledge, 2019. p. 225. 
12 IISS. The Military Balance 2020. Routledge, 2020. pp. 261-262. 16
 Ibid. pp. 256-265. 
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doctrinal commitment to using Chinese military capability defensively, as this non-offensive 
representation is a deeply rooted element of Chinese strategic culture. 
While ample volumes of intellectual works in IR literature are devoted to doubting the 
strategic reality of this defense-natured Chinese representation, it is also beyond the limits 
of this paper to realistically question Beijing’s strategic disposition regarding the use of 
military force. 
US Strategy and Alliances in East Asia - Changing perceptions of regional security 
The United States is involved in the Asia Pacific regional security complex through its 
bilateral security alliance framework, sometimes referred to as the “Hub-and-Spokes” or 
“San Fransisco System”.13 Regarding Northeast Asia, this encompasses the US-Japan and US-
South Korea alliances and before the Nixon administration’s China policy shift,14 it used to 
include the alliance between Washington and the nationalist Chinese government in Taipei. 
Due to this, the strategic deterrent factor of the US “nuclear umbrella” in Northeast Asia 
currently includes only South Korea and Japan. The position of Taiwan is much more 
complicated. 
After formal recognition as the representative government of China shifted to Beijing, 
and the “One China” principle has become international norm, the US-Taiwan alliance 
relations could no longer function the way they were established early in the Cold War. The 
US has adopted the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which in terms of security cooperation, 
outlines US commitment towards Taipei’s security in the form of arms sales. The American 
security guarantee regarding Taiwan is usually described with “Strategic Ambiguity”, which 
means that the US does not give explicit guarantee for Taipei but does not rule out the 
possibility of supporting Taiwan in case of an attack. 
Concerning the rise of Chinese military capabilities, the US geostrategic tradition is 
confronted with a two-faceted challenge, one direct and one indirect threat perception. The 
former is US access to global sea lines of communication without any potential challengers, 
the latter is the threat looming over the member of the “Hub-and-Spokes System”. As 
previously mentioned, Chinese military modernization had a two-stage focus on reducing 
the vulnerability of Chinese maritime interests, first a “denial” strategy of A2/AD and 
subsequently, the buildup of naval power projection capabilities. The US geopolitical 
tradition is deeply rooted in the concept of “Sea Power” which regards unchallenged access 
to global sea lines of communications as vital for American interests. China’s A2/AD – 
although defensive in nature – threatens this undisturbed access to a large portion of the 
Asia Pacific littoral and as such, has sparked major reactions in US strategic and operational 
doctrinal thinking regarding naval capabilities. One example of this is the operational 
 
13 “Hub-and-Spokes” refers to the strictly bilateral nature of US East Asian alliances, which is quite different from 
the multilateral institutional tradition of NATO; “San Fransisco System” comes from the fact that most of the 
security cooperation agreements were signed after the 1951 San Fransisco peace conference, that resolved 
the Asia Pacific theatres of World War II. 
14 Through which the US enacted a rapprochement towards communist China, making it a significant partner in 
American Cold War strategy against the USSR. Through this process, the US changed its policy and shifted 
recognition of a legitimate Chinese government from Taiwan to mainland China. 
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concept and relevant capability development of the concept of AirSea Battle,15  the US 
answer to the perceived challenge of Chinese A2/AD. 
Chinese military buildup paired with a highly assertive behavior regarding disputed 
territorial claims and a more confrontative rhetoric regarding issues such as Taiwan, 
increases the structural stress on the “Hub-and-Spokes” alliance system, since many of its 
formal and informal members are involved in these flashpoints. As such, the US has to 
balance between confirming its commitments to allies while trying not to draw China into 
an escalating process. Such balancing was the case in the early 2010s, when Sino-Japanese 
tensions rose regarding the Senkaku islands and it took the Obama administration 4 years 
to publicly reaffirm its security guarantee to Japan regarding the disputed island group.16 
The rise of China as a revisionist power raised some questions on the durability of the 
“Hub-and-Spokes” system, as it opened up the question whether the US allies would rather 
realign their security policies to accommodate with the regional hegemon. Samuel 
Huntington’s iconic monograph, “The Clash of Civilizations” envisions a global conflict in the 
2010s as a thought experiment and predicts that some US allies in the Pacific – Japan in 
particular – would likely switch sides and join China against their current American ally.17 
Nevertheless, we do not see US allies in territorial disputes with China realign their 
geopolitical configuration to accommodate Beijing as a regional hegemon. This would pose 
the question, why do not members of the “Hub-and-Spokes” system “bandwagon” towards 
a rising regional power. A satisfying answer could be drawn from “balance of threat” theory, 
conceptualized by Stephen M. Walt in his 1985 article, Alliance formation and the balance 
of world power. Walt argues that while neo-realist theory would suggest that states most 
likely choose “bandwagoning” towards a rising regional power, in reality, calculation on 
alliance alignment are much more complex. States form their alliance strategy based on 
perceived threats along several factors regarding regional balance of power. Some of these 
factors outlined by Walt can shed light on why the “Hub-and-Spokes” system does not 
gravitate towards a rising China. One such factor is the proximity of a rising power, which 
suggests that states regard others that are close as greater of a threat because the ability to 
project power declines over distance. Another factor is that Walt calls “offensive 
intentions”. If the perceived intentions of a rising power point toward confrontation, states 
will be more likely to form alliances to oppose such a state as they fear of becoming a target 
of belligerent behavior for it in the future.18 If we look at the threat perceptions in Taiwan 
and Japan’s strategic documents, we will see precisely this factor highlighted as Taipei and 
Tokyo both formulate substantial perceptions of threat by China. 
As previously mentioned, China frames its increasing might as defensive in nature both 
towards its domestic and international audiences. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
 
15 Krepinevich, Andrew, Why AirSea Battle?. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) 2010. 
16 Obama Asia tour: US-Japan treaty ‘covers disputed islands’ BBC. 24 April 2014. 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, 1996. pp. 312-
318. 
18 Walt, Stephen M., “Alliance formation and the balance of world power.“ International security 9.4 
(1985). 
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question the sincerity of this defensive disposition in Chinese strategic culture. However, 
there is one important factor in China’s security doctrine that is highly relevant to an analysis 
of Japanese and Taiwanese strategic reactions to Beijing’s growing military capabilities. As 
Beijing’s latest National Defense White Paper proclaims, China’s strategic commitments for 
its national defense aims at the safeguarding of China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
This includes the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) islands in the East China Sea, an archipelago 
of small, uninhabited islands currently under Japanese administration but also claimed by 
Beijing. Another problematic aspect of strategic objective in the 2019 Chinese White Paper 
from an outside-Beijing prospective is the question of Taiwan, according to which China 
„make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force…” as according to the Chinese leadership 
“China must and will be reunited”.19 
 
Map of the Taiwan strait 
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6b/Taiwan_Strait.png) 
Consequently, however genuinely defensive China’s strategic culture might or might 
not be, declared strategic commitments create clashes of interest and overlapping claims of 
sovereignty with neighboring actors such as Japan and Taiwan. Without disputing either 
 
19 Republic of China (Taiwan), Ministry of Defense. 2017 National Defense Report, Republic of China 2017. 
National Defense Report Editorial Committee. 2018. p. 17. 
Figure 1. 
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sides’ standpoints on these issues, we can accept that such Chinese strategic proclamations, 
coupled with the increasing military capabilities of the PLA, create a perception of threat in 
regional powers that have conflicts of interests with Beijing. Such perceptions are visible in 
both Japanese and Taiwanese official strategic documents. Taiwan’s 2017 National Defense 
Report white paper for example identifies China’s acquisition of military power projection 
capability as a factor that challenges regional security, increases the ability of Beijing to 
attack Taiwan, and raises the difficulty of the international community to intervene, 
“presenting a serious threat to [Taiwan’s] national defense and security”.20 
Japan’s National Security Strategy also mentions the rise of Chinese military capabilities 
as well as Chinese intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters – the main concern being the 
areas around the Senkaku islands –, calling such trends as issues of concern for Japan. 
Regarding these trends, both Japan and Taiwan’s published strategic documents mention 
deterrence as a core strategy for dealing with security threats and challenges. 
Japan’s Limited deterrence Strategy 
Japan’s expressed concerns regarding China’s rising military capabilities and perceived 
threats to the sovereignty of Japanese territory are centered around the country’s 
southernmost small island groups, the Senkakus. But this new kind of threat perception is 
quite different from the preparation for a Soviet invasion from the north – as was the 
paradigm in the bipolar global power struggle – so the adaptation to this new threat 
perception required deep structural changes in the Japanese defense policy. 
Post-World War II Japan’s defense and security were centered around the Yoshida 
doctrine – named after the first post-war prime minister – of keeping a low profile in security 
policy, developing only minimal defense capabilities, and concentrating on economic 
development. Japan relied on the US Alliance as a deterrent against external threats, 
especially its inclusion under Washington’s nuclear umbrella. Some structural and force 
buildup changes have developed in the later years of the Cold War, on conventional military 
capabilities for national defense, but the Yoshida doctrine initially seemed more than 
enough for the post-Cold War era. 
Yet, even with the pacifist overtones at the end of the Cold War, the Jieitai, the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), were one of the leading militaries in terms of 
technological advancement and capabilities – regardless of restrictions on some offensive 
capabilities – and even with the defense budget capped at 1% of the country’s annual GDP, 
it was still amongst the top 10 countries. The JSDF was 
 
20 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s National Defense in the 
New Era. 2019. July, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm 
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Map of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Maps_of_Senkaku_Islands#/media /File:Senkaku_Diaoyu_Tiaoyu_Islands.png) 
equipped by the domestic military industry as well as cutting edge technology acquired from 
Japan’s ally, the United States. 
Some specific projects in the recent enhancement of Japan’s defense capabilities point 
towards slightly different operational concerns than during the Cold War however, when 
the doctrine focused on halting a Soviet invasion of the northern island of Hokkaido. The 
emphasis has shifted from northern territorial defense towards more complex defense 
concepts. One of these new trends is restructuring the Jieitai towards a more rapidly 
deployable force capable of retaking distant islands in case of an attack. 
In 2013, amongst some changes in Japanese defense policy making, the Abe cabinet 
approved a new National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), which called for a structural 
and operational capability enhancement of the Jieitai, aiming for a “Dynamic Joint Defense 
Force” (DJDF). The key aspect of a DJDF was to be capable of “Response to an attack on 
remote islands”.21 As the 2013 NDPG states, this would require Jietai to: 
“…intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air 
superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units 
 
21  Ministry of Defense, Japan: NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2014 and beyond. 
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf 
Figure 2. 
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deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any 
remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or 
cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately.” 
This retaking of distant islands requires naval power projection abilities, which are 
based on the capabilities hosted by both the Maritime Self-Defense Forces and the Ground 
Self-Defense Forces. The former operates three amphibious assault ships of the Osumi class, 
with similar functions as the Chinese Yuzhao class, developed in the late 1990s and entered 
into service at the turn of the millennium. The JGSDF has contributed to the amphibious 
aspect of new defense doctrines by establishing the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade 
in 2018, practically a small corps of marines, a practice absent in the Japanese military after 
the Second World War.26 
The disposition of JSDF forces has also been reconfigured. At the end of the Cold War, 
Japan’s heavy forces were stationed near Hokkaido, as the main objective was to halt any 
possible Soviet invasion. During the last decade, Tokyo has reconfigured the location of its 
forces in a way that more heavy armor units and rapid deployment brigades are also located 
closer to the southern part of the country, closer to vulnerable remote islands and more 
strategically tailored towards deterring attacks against remote islands and retaking them if 
necessary.27 Regarding a more powerful military, Japan’s main concern is an attack on its 
distant archipelagos, most probably the Senkaku islands, so its deterrence strategy is 
focused on repelling Chinese offensive actions in distant operational environments and 
retaking lost islets, both of which required for Japan to enhance its power projection 
capabilities. 
Taiwan’s limited deterrence Strategy 
In the case of Taiwan, changing Chinese capabilities have similarly necessitated changes in 
the island’s defense strategy, but unlike in the case of Japan, where political/historical 
pacifism and deep-rooted doctrinal paradigms meant a more structural change, Taiwan’s 
traditional defense policy has always configured itself to resist an offensive by Mainland 
China. Also, unlike Japan, Taiwan’s main security concern is not necessarily a limited 
contingency regarding some distant islets – although the issues of Quemoy and Matsu do 
present such possible scenarios – but the unilateral unification by Beijing, using military 
power. 
Consequently, the strategy to deter such a Chinese invasion is not a new concept within 
Taiwanese defense strategy but changing Chinese capabilities have meant a necessary 
reconfiguration and enhancement of Taiwan’s own defense capacities. 
, official website of the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force: 
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/gcc/ardb/index.html 
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Quemoy and Matsu islands 
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6b/Taiwan_Strait.png highlights added by author) 
However, the rapid enhancement of Taiwan’s defense capabilities has met its 
limitations in the past decades. On the one hand, the size and proportion to China’s 
parameters of Taiwan’s economy mean that while exponential GDP growth meant 
exponential increase in defense spending for Beijing, Taipei could not consequently increase 
its defense related expenditures to keep up with the pace experienced by the PLA. 
Instead, it opted for a reconfiguration of its armed forces and capabilities, one that 
placed much less emphasis on ground forces and much more attention to naval, air and 
more precisely air and missile defense capabilities. In 1989, Taiwan fielded a ground force 
army of 270,000 personnel, which has gradually been decreased to its current 88,000 pers. 
strength, while both number of personnel and high-end equipment acquisitions were more 
focused on the Air Force and the Navy.22 
In the early 2000s, Taipei’s primary focus was the threat of Chinese ballistic missile, so 
main developments were focused on deterrence, in the form of cruise missiles and ballistic 
missile defense related acquisitions.23 But while the necessity of force reconfiguration and 
modernization was tangible, political circumstances slowed the process of weapons system 
developments and acquisitions. In the late 2000s however, starting in 2007, Taipei was able 
to secure key deals in missile, missile defense, and fighter aircraft acquisitions from the 
 
22 IISS. The Military Balance 1989. Routledge, 1989. pp. 175-176.; IISS. The Military Balance 2019. Routledge, 2019. 
pp. 307-310. 
23 IISS. The Military Balance 2005. Routledge, 2005. pp. 259-260. 
Figure 3. 
ANDRÁS BARTÓK: Structural similarities in Japan and Taiwan’s limited deterrence strategies 
HADTUDOMÁNY 2020/4. 43 
United States and started the process of significantly upgrading its deterrence capabilities 
regarding and invasion of the island.24 
Currently, Taiwan has substantial military capabilities to highly reduce the operational 
confidence of mainland China in a cross-strait amphibious assault contingency. The Republic 
of China (RoC, Taiwan) Air Defense and Missile Command deploys a high number of surface-
to-air missiles and missile defense systems, such as the domestically developed Hsiung Feng 
II cruise missiles or the US made Patriot PAC-3 SAM systems.25 The RoC Air Force has a small, 
but modern fleet of fighter aircraft, mostly consisting of F-16s responsible primarily for air 
superiority, with some additional domestic Ching-Kuo and other multirole fighters. The RoC 
Navy is very small compared to the PLA, with much less surface combatant warships 
equipped with anti-ship missiles and also only four tactical submarines. However, because 
Taiwan’s main concern is to repel a landing on its shores, this small fleet should be 
considered mostly in the role of coastal defense, where the land-based radar installations 
and other force multiplier factors can greatly enhance its capacity. Taiwan’s drive towards 
force modernization and reform, coupled with the strategy of deterrence is expressed in the 
latest Quadrennial Defense Review (2017) by its Ministry of Defense. The document also 
acknowledges the dire asymmetry of force enhancements vis-a-vis China and calls for a 
deterrence oriented defense strategy based on the use of what limited assets Taipei has at 
its disposal, mainly by reforms of modernization and creating a joint operational practice 
within the RoC services.26 
Overall, the quantitative imbalance of forces means that Taiwan cannot realistically 
hope to repel a full-scale invasion from China. However, it can increase the losses of the PLA 
as well as create such a contested operational environment that the political will behind an 
attack from the mainland has to factor in severe military losses, a slow pace of offensive and 
a dragged out contingency, which makes it difficult to quickly present the Taiwanese public 
and the international community with a fait accompli unification with mainland China. 
Conclusion – Japanese and Taiwanese limited Deterrence 
Within the field of IR and Security Studies, intellectual approaches and the theory of 
deterrence have been dominated by a tradition of Cold War bipolar nuclear strategies and 
thus the framework of deterrence is usually applied to super-powers’ nuclear strategies. 
However, the changing distribution of power on a global scale coupled with increasing 
interconnectedness due to globalization have meant that the geopolitical context in which 
thinking about deterrence occurs and the application of deterrence strategies have become 
more complex. As such, theoretical approaches to 
 
24 IISS The Military Balance 2008. Routledge, 2008. pp. 361-362. 
25 IISS. The Military Balance 2019. Routledge, 2019. pp. 307-310. 
26 Republic of China (Taiwan), Ministry of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review 2017. Quadrennial Defense Review 
Editing Committee, Taipei, 2017. pp. 4., 11. 
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Picture of the Taiwan strait waters, at one of its narrowest points between China and 
Taiwan, from the Northern outskirts of Hsinchu city, Taiwan 
(Photo taken by the author on 18th December 2019) 
deterrence and the use of its framework IR analysis needs to adapt to the changing global 
dynamics. The study of deterrence by actors other than nuclear powers contributes to 
understanding the concept and strategy of deterrence and its representation in the strategic 
perceptions of international actors. 
Japan and Taiwan are relevant examples for the study of deterrence as they are both 
located in a region that is central to narratives of global power competition between the 
United States and China. Tokyo and Taipei both have key conflicts of geopolitical interest 
with Beijing and both are in a severe quantitative disadvantage regarding Chinese military 
capabilities. Both have traditionally relied on security guarantees from the United States. 
Nevertheless, in recent decades both have expressed strategic concerns regarding the 
increase of Chinese military capabilities, and both have formulated national defense 
strategies that express and emphasize deterrence as their central concepts. While neither 
has questioned the credibility of US security guarantee, both have expressed the need for 
self-reliance in deterring unilateral action to change the status quo of relevant geopolitical 
flashpoints. Japan and Taiwan have opted for deterrence strategies that aim to create a 
contested operational environment to deny the opportunity for China of swiftly winning a 
contingency and presenting the international community with a fait-accompli situation. 
Japanese and Taiwanese deterrence strategies are tailored for a limited contingency – in 
the case of Taiwan an amphibious landing by China not an all-out ballistic missile or bombing 
campaign against the general population – and have two main target audiences, the political 
leadership in Beijing and the international community. The former is to be discouraged from 
a unilateral action by the credible threat of a contested operational environment and the 
denial of a quick victory without consequences. The international community and the 
United States as a target audience are to be signaled of the commitment of self-reliant 
defense strategy by Tokyo and Taipei. This is so as not to lose international support prior to 
any contingency by the perception that Japan and Taiwan have no strategic agency in 
deterring a Chinese military action regarding their respective clash of interests with Beijing. 
Figure 4. 
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Whether or not this will prove to be a successful strategic choice will depend on the 
abilities of Tokyo and Taipei to keep limited deterrence options based on a qualitative edge 
even with a quantitative disadvantage, as well as the perception in the international 
community regarding the changing balance of power in East Asia. 
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